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TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS
The human desire of judges to uphold transactions rather
than let them fail is responsible for upholding as non-testamentary many a transaction which in strict logic would seem
to be testamentary. Less commonly transactions axe condemned
as testamentary which in all logic would not seem to be testamentary at all. It may be worth while, therefore, to consider
briefly the elements that distinguish a testamentary disposition
from a transaction inter vivos, and to examine the most common
cases where the matter is of consequence.
A will may be defined as the means whereby one disposes of
his property at his death or appoints an executor or a guardian
for his orphan child or does any combination of these things. It
does not affect the property until his death and is revocable
until then. These two factors, ineffectiveness until death and
revocability until that time, are in some respects different aspects
of the same requirement that the disposition of the property to
be testamentary must not bind the disposer until his death, but
the two factors are by no means identical. The first relates to
the effect of the transaction on the property itself while the
second concerns the power of the disposer to revoke. The first
relates to the property, the second to the person. The power to
revoke may exist and yet there be no will because a trust has
been created or a gift mortis causa made. 1 The two factors are
summed up in the word ambulatory. The characteristic thing
about a will as compared with other instruments is that it is
ambulatory, binding neither the testator nor his property until
his death. Whether a disposition of property is testamentary
or not is said to depend on testamentary intent but testamentary intent goes back to these two factors. If the disposition of property is intended to bind neither the disposer nor his
ISee infra.
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property until his death, the transaction is properly testamentary although no conscious thought of the act of disposition
amounting to a will has entered the disposer's mind and its form
be that of a deed or some other transaction quite different from
a will.
Of the two factors that go to make a disposition testamentary, ineffectiveness until death and revocability, the former
has been by far the more conspicuous. Revocability is likely to
be treated as a consequence of the testamentary character of
the transaction rather than as one of its constituent elements. 2
The fact that no interest in the property is to shift until after
death is likely to over-shadow the fact that the transaction may
have been intended as binding from its date and hence to lack
that defeasible, revocable, ambulatory character that makes the
will.
Not every disposition of property that will necessarily be
deferred until the death of the transferor or after, is, therefore,
testamentary. Under the familiar rule against perpetuities it is
possible to limit property by a settlement at the time of marriage
so that it will not vest until twenty-one years after the death of
the married couple yet no one thinks of the marriage settlement,
on that account, as testamentary. Under the older law freeholds could not be limited in futuro and therefore could not be
made to shift after the transferor's death but neither could they
be made to shift at the Christmas following the transaction.
Leaseholds, however, could be made to commence in the future
and might be made to commence at the lessor's death.3 Nor
4
were they considered, on that account, to be testamentary. In
the case of the will control of the property is retained by the
testator. In the above cases of the marriage settlement and of
the leasehold in futuro the transferer in his lifetime has parted
with control over the property to the extent of the limitation and
the transaction differs substantially and not merely technically
from a will. Take the case of a trust without power of revocation made to provide for an unfortunate child after the parent's
death. No interest need vest in the child until after the parent's
death and yet if the parents have put the property beyond their
control, the case is essentially different from that of a will.
#See
Rood on Wills (2' ed.) 6L
3

CZerk v. Clerl, 2 Vern. 323 (1694), Warren, Cases on Property 483.

'Id.
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The function then of a will is to effect a post mortem disposition of property without interfering in the slightest with
the disposer's power over the property while he lives. Logically
any transaction with this function in view should be regarded
as testamentary. The technique of the law however often cuts
across functional lines. And it has in this case. Functionally
the gift mortis causa and the revokable trust with full powers
in the hands of the donor until his death5 are as testamentary
as the will proper but they have a technical operation on the
property in the donor's lifetime, and they are therefore placed
outside the testamentary circle.
The non-obligatory character of a will until the testator's
death, its inoperativeness on the property until that time, its
revocability by the testator, the fact that it leaves the testator unhampered in the control of the property are summed up, as has
already been said, in the technical phrase that a will is ambulatory until the testator's death. Whether, in a given ease, there is
to be a disposition of the property at death will ordinarily be
apparent from the terms of the instrument itself but whether the
one executing the instrument intends to keep control of it and
complete power of disposition over the property in the meantime
is not likely to be so apparent but in the absence of extrinsic
evidence to be a matter of inference. Thus in the usual form of
will it is not thought necessary to reserve an express power of
revocation. The difficult question of intent therefore is as to
whether the instrument in question was intended to be ambulatory. Often this intent does exist although the form of the instrument be that of a conveyance inter vivos for the wish to keep
the same control over property as in case of a will and yet avoid
the expense of probate and administration is widespread. Often,
too, there is a desire to avoid the inheritance tax but liability to
the inheritance tax usually depends on the succession to the enjoyment of the property at death and does not depend, as the
will does, on the ambulatory character of the disposition of the
property prior to that time. With this general analysis of the
character of testamentary dispositions we will proceed to consider come of the specific transactions to which this analysis is
applicable.
5See infra.
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GIFTS MORTIS CAUSA

A gift mortis causa is a gift of personal property in apprehension of sudden death as in a last illness or by soldier on the
approach of battle. It is subject to be defeated at the wish of
the donor or by his recovery from the peril of death or by the
prior death of the donee. Such a gift need not be a death-bed
gift for the soldier may be in the best of health or the last illness
may be of long duration but the emphasis placed on the fact that
the donor need not be in eztremis would indicate the death-bed
gift as the tpical case. The fact that these gifts do not become absolute until the death of the donor distinguishes them
from the ordinary gift inter vivos and enables them to serve
much the same function as a legacy or will. As already pointed
out, the distinction between them and the legacy is highly technical and especially in England has sometimes been in name only
except that to have called them legacies would have invalidated
them or made their operation very different.
The gift mortis causa had its origin in the Roman or civil
law where it had a wide range. There was much discussion
among the Roman jurists as to whether it had more of the
characteristics of a gift or of a legacy. 6 Justinian decreed that
it was predominately a legacy and should be attested by five
witnesses. 7 Two of the early English writers borrowed it from
the civil laws but there was little occasion to make use of it
prior to the Statute of Frauds0 as oral wills of personal
property were universal and easily proved. The Statute of
Frauds made such drastic requirements for oral or nuncupative
wills, as they were called, that they became relatively of little
importance but there was a human appeal to death-bed gifts
that could not be resisted and in the eighteenth century the
Chancery judges definitely recognized the gift mortis causa as
part of the English law.' o Their place in English and American
law has never been questioned since though sometimes regretted.
The difficulties that the Roman jurists had with gifts mortis
"Hunter, Roman Law (2 ed.) 916.
T
Id.
8Bracton and Swinburne.
'29 Car. II c. 3 (1677).
'O The first English case recognizing the gift mortis causa seems
to have been Jones v. Selby, Prec. in Chan. 300 (1710). See Thornton
on Gifts, 13.
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causa were known to the Chancery judges who adopted them
into the English law and the great English Chancellor, Hardwicke, definitely rejected two of the types of such gifts in the
civil law but put the stamp of his approval on a third, in which
there was a delivery and an immediate passing of property to
the donee." Lord Hardwicke, however, stressed the delivery
rather than the immediate passing of title and in the subsequent
English authorities less stress is laid on the fact of the gift
mortis causa being an immediate though defeasible gift than in
the United States.12 Accordingly the gift mortis causa has had
much more the character of an irregular legacy in England than
in the United States. 13 In England it has been something apart
by itself while in the United States it has had a profound influence on the transfer of securities by gift inter vivos.'4 However the real position of the English law would appear to be not
that in the gift mortis causa no title passes to the donee until
the donor's death but that the title passing at the time of the
gift need be equitable only.15
The same human element that allowed the gift mortis causa
in the first place has given it a wide application. The doctrine
has been applied to bonds and certificates of stock, to commercial paper and insurance policies, to savings bank books and
even to mortgages, although in each case the real interest transferred is a chose in action in itself incapable of delivery. And
the property transferred by gift mortis causa may be of great
value. Thus in a celebrated English case16 the gift was of two
mortgages, one of which was for a sum between two and three
thousand pounds and the other for thirty thousand pounds.
The old question that bothered the Roman lawyers as to
whether the gift mortis causa has more of the characteristics of
a legacy or a gift is still a troublesome one. It has the function
of a legacy and even though a present but defeasible gift be
insisted on, the fact that the line between such a gift and one
not to take effect at all until the death of the donor is a rather
shadowy one is shown by the difficulty there has been in deter-

W Zard v. Turner, 1 Dick 170 (1752.)

" See 15 Halsbury, Laws of England, 431.
IId. 435.
1 See Rundell, Gifts of Choses in Action, 27 Yale Law Journ. 643.
I Jarman on Wills, (7 ed.) 49-51.
"Duffield v. Elwes, 1 Bligh, N. S. 497 (1827).
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mining which is the doctrine of the English law. If regarded
as an anomalous legacy the tendency is to keep it pretty narrowly within the limits laid down by Lord Hardwicke and to
insist on the physical handing over of the property or something
that represents it and that at the time of the gift. If regarded
merely as another kind of gift the tendency is to allow the transfer by any means whereby a gift inter vivos is effected and this
may be by deed or other instrument of gift without delivery
or by mere words if the donee is already in possession. Lord
Bowen thought that to allow the gift mortis causa without
change of possession would be to drive a coach and four through
the Statute of Wills.17 We cannot help but feel that Lord
Bowen was right and that especially in the United States where
any written instrument is likely to have the same effect as a
deed of gift, to allow the gift nortis causa by instrument of gift
would be to leave very little application of the Wills statutes
to gifts of chattels during a last illness. It would give gifts
mortis causa a great extension. In Engand, a gift mortis causa
by mere words to one already in possession is allowed' s while
in the United States the authorities are pretty evenly divided. 19
If it is hard to sustain gifts mortis causa as anything but
testamentary when the chattel is delivered directly to the donee,
it is even more so where the chattel is handed to a third party
to be delivered to the donee at the donor's death or "if I (the
donor) die." If either of these cases can be construed as a present gift to the donee or as a present gift to the third party
in trust for the donee, though subject to revocation by the donor,
then the case is like that of the direct delivery to the donee but
to find any such present title either in the donee or in the third
party is to reduce title almost to the vanishing point and shows
how really testamentary these gifts mortis causa are. Here the
courts make a distinction. If the chattel is to be delivered "at
the death" of the donor or words to that effect, the weight of
authority is that a present gift is intended. 20 If the chattel
is to be delivered "if I die" or words to that effect some courts
give these words their natural meaning, construe them to create
'In re Hughes, 36 Wkly. Rep. 821 (1888).
Cain v. Moon, 2 Q. B. 283 (1896).
9

371.

1 See Mechem, Delivery in Gifts of Chattels, 21 IlL. Law Rev. 368MId. 600.
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a condition precedent to the vesting of title and hold the gift
invalid as testamentary. 21 About an equal number, however,
consider them to mean nothing more than the ordinary conditions implied in every gift mortis causa, construe them to create
a condition subsequent and uphold the gift as a valid gift mortis
causa.22
REvocABLE TRUSTS

In contrast with the formal gift mortis causa is the lawyerly
revocable trust under which the donee is to enjoy no beneficial
interest in the property until the donor's death. Unlike the
gift ))zortis cause it is applicable to real as to personal property
and need not be executed during the donor's last illness. Like
the gift mortis causa, however, its technical differentiation from
the will proper is due to the transfer of title in this case to the
trustee, during the lifetime of the donor. A transfer defeasible
at the will of the donor is distinguished from a transfer that
is entirely ineffective until the donor's death. However, such
trusts are commonly deliberate attempts to avoid probate, they
have not the human appeal of the gift mortis causa and have
frequently been declared of no effect as unattested wills. 23 But
the tendency as a whole is to regard them as valid. 24
REVOCABLE DELIVERY TO THIRD PARTY FOR THE DoNEE.

Probably the most common attempt to avoid probate is by
means of a deed which is left with instructions that it shall be
recorded on the grantor's death or is handed to a third party
for that purpose. Unless in some way a delivery can be made
out in the lifetime of the grantor the deed is of no effect although
where there is no contest, the transaction may stand and be
healed by the lapse of time. If delivery is made to a third party
to have the deed recorded or to deliver it to the donee and the
grantor puts it out of his power to recall the deed, such delivery
is considered a delivery in the lifetime of the grantor and the
2 Id. 398.
= Id. 599.
2 See McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 201 Mass. 50
(1909), Scott, Cases on Trusts, 211 and note Id. 215.
'See Kelly v. Parker, 181 Ill. 49 (1899), Warren Cases on Wills
and Administration, 101 and note Id. 105.

KENTUcKY LAw JouRNAN

transaction stands. 25 In such a case the property is effectively
bound in the lifetime of the grantor and although the enjoyment
by the grantee is postponed until the grantor's death there is
no power of revocation in the grantor to make the transaction
testamentary. But where the deed is handed to the third party
but subject to recall at the will of the grantor, neither the property nor the grantor is bound in his lifetime and the delivery
to the third party cannot properly be considered a delivery to
the grantee. Such is the almost universal rule. 26 The considerable authority in favor of deliveries to third parties in the case
w
7
e
notwithstanding the revocable character
of gifts mortis caus
of the gift is evidence of the real character of gifts mortis causa
as essentially testamentary.
Where a deed is delivered to a third party with an irrevocable power to deliver it to the grantee on the grantor's death,
therefore, there is no difficulty in making out a valid delivery
and a transaction binding on the grantor in his lifetime. The
difficult matter has been to accommodate the transaction to the
general law of real property. It cannot be considered as a present transfer of the entire fee for the grantor retains the property until his death. On the other hand at common law a
grantor could not reserve a life estate to himself nor could he
grant the freehold in futuro. Now quite commonly by statute
or otherwise a freehold may be granted in futuro and if so there
is no reason why the fee should not shift to the grantee on the
grantor's death. As the transaction is binding from the delivery
to the third party, it is non-testamentary in essence as well as
in form. Whether from the fear that the shifting of the property at death might make the transaction look too much like
a will or because of the old common law rule against transfers
of the freehold in futuro, many courts have preferred to treat
the transaction as effecting a present transfer of the fee to the
grantee with an implied life estate in the grantor 2s although
under the older law there was just as much objection to the
reservation of a life estate as to the transfer in futuro. This
preference for the implied life estate would therefore seem to
See W heeright v. Wheelright, 2 Mass. 447 (1807), Warren, Cases
on Conveyances 632 and Id. 637 n.
21See
Cook v. Brown, 34 N. H. 460. (1857), Warren, Cases on Conveyances 641 and I. 646 n. See also 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2 ed.)
See infra.
2s See 2 Tiffany Real Prop. (2 ed.) 1784.
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be due to the fear that the shifting at death would, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the transaction, make it testamentary. This fear, as has been shown, is ungrounded.
A more difficult case involving an irrevocable delivery to a
third party is where the deed is to be delivered to the grantee
on the performance of some condition by the grantee. Here
there is a real contingency precedent to the transfer of the property, that is, the performance of the condition, whereas in the
former case the death of the grantor was bound to happen and
only its date was uncertain. Suppose the condition is not performed in the grantor's lifetime. The condition is a condition
precedent and it is pure fiction to say that when the condition
is performed the transfer relates back to the time of the delivery.
Nevertheless the transaction would not seem to be testamentary.
The mere fact of a post-mortem transfer is not sufficient to make
it such. There is a transaction that is binding on the grantor
in his lifetime although only conditionally so and this is sufficient
to take the transaction out of the testamentary class. Nor would
it seem to change the nature of the transaction if the condition
be one that never can be performed in the grantor's lifetime but
by its very terms is to be performed after the grantor's death.2 9
Such a transaction is not ambulatory and is therefore essentially
and not merely technically different from a will.
CONTRACTS TO DEVISE or BEQUEATH.

The first impression of a contract to devise or bequeath is
likely to be one of repugnancy. A man is bound by his contracts. He is not bound by his will. There is a seeming incompatability in a man being bound to do something that when done
will not be binding on him. A court of equity will not compel
a man to do a vain thing and it would be a vain thing to compel a man to execute a will which he could instantly revoke. If
a contract not to revoke is valid, does not that present the
anomaly of an irrevocable will even though technically the court
may refuse probate because of a revocation made despite the
contract?
There would be much strength to these objections if the
mere fact of a post-mortem disposition of property was sufficient
See Xolan v. Otney, 75 Kan. 311 (1907), Warren, Qases on Conveyances, 637 and Id. 641 n.
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to make a transaction testamentary. However, as we have seen,
even the freehold may now be granted in futuro by deed and if
in futuro there is no reason why the title to the property may
not be made to shift at the grantor's death. If H contracts to
devise Blackacre to B that is as much as to say that he will
execute the instrument that will give Blackacre to B at his
death. It differs from the conveyance to take effect on death in
that the latter is automatic while in the case of the contract
something further is necessary, either the making of a will or
the inter-position of a court of equity to compel the one who
succeeds to H's title to make the transfer. The contract to
devise is therefore no more objectionable than the conveyance
to take effect at the death of the grantor. Neither is revokable
and neither, therefore, is testamentary. Even less objectionable
is the contract to bequeath which because of the personal character of the property is not subject to specific performances and
would not bind any particular property but a breach of which
would subject the promisor's estate to damages. There is no
reason why a man should not bind his estate to pay money even
though he himself can never be sued on the contract.3 0 A bare
promise to pay after death is testamentary because not binding
on the promisor 3 1 but a contract is as binding as a conveyance
and neither is testamentary. If a contract to pay money after
death should be forbidden one's ability to make the most of his
property in his old age would be much limited.
Courts naturally look on claims of contracts to devise or
bequeath with much suspicion 32 for entirely aside from the
danger of fraud or perjury there is great danger that those who
have been disappointed in what were perhaps their just expectations from the deceased will attempt to convert into contracts
what were perhaps mere hopes and at best mere promises. But
if the requirements for contracts are fully met including the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds, there would seem to be
no reason to discriminate against them merely because they remove from the testator's power property which would otherwise be subject to his free disposition.
3 At one time

Lectures on

the law seems to have been otherwise.

Legal History

195.

See Ames,

"See Cover v. Stem, 67 Md. 449 (1887). Mechem and Atkinson,
Cases on Wills and Administration, 133 and Id. 135 n.
"Gardner on Wills, (2 ed.) 66.
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JOINT AND MUTUAL WrS533

Joint and mutual wills may be made by others than husbands and wives but theirs is the common case. Especially
where there are no children it is a common thing for husbands
and wives to make wills in favor of the survivor. Such wills
are commonly called mutual or reciprocal wills. Usually they
are the result of an understanding between the two and if this
understanding amounts to a contract, relief may be had on this
contract if in violation of it the other revokes his or her will.
There is no difference in this respect between these contracts
and other contracts to devise or bequeath. Sometimes it is said
that such wills are revocable only on notice to the other but
such notice would seem to have no bearing on the revocability
34
of the will but merely on the breach of contract.
A more difficult case is where a joint devise or bequest is
made to third parties, say, to the children. If a life interest is
first given to the survivor and then the property is to go to the
children there is no intended suspension of the operation of the
will of the one dying first. The intention is that it shall be
probated without waiting for the death of the other although
of course the joint gift can not take effect in possession until
that time. In these cases of joint gifts a contract is very easily
found 35 and since the death of the one precludes any notice,
the revocation of the will by the survivor is almost certain to
be a breach of contract on his part. Loosely it is sometimes said
that on the death of the one the will becomes irrevocable. 36 More
properly it would seem the contract then becomes absolute.
Joint and mutual wills of this kind are valid although they in
effect divest the survivor of his testamentary power perhaps for
a considerable period of his life.
Where the will is of property held jointly by the two testators and the only provision is the gift over after the death of the
survivor there is difficulty in giving effect to the will as such
unless it can be treated after the manner of the will in the preceding paragraph. A will subject only to joint revocation or
3'For a criticism of joint and mutual wills see Partridge, The

Revocability of Alutual or Reciprocal Wills. 77 University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 357.
See 1 Page on Wills (2 ed.) 153-4.
MSee Gardner on Wills (2 ed.) 77 n. 7.
" See 1 Page on Wills (2 ed.) 153.
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to joint probate would be an anomaly in the law. If a joint will
cannot be treated as the individual will of each testator subject
to revocation by him as to his share and subject to probate on
87
his death it does not lie properly within the testamentary field
but should be relegated if anywhere to the domain of contracts
or trusts. The fear that the joint will could not be treated as
the individual will of each testator was probably what influenced
the early English judges to deny the joint will any place in the
testamentary law.38
PERcy
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811 Page on Wills (2 ed.) 151, Gardner on Wills (2 ed.) 76.
"1 Page on Wills (2 ed.) 147.

